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During World War I, Germany sought to provoke numerous insurrections 
throughout the  British  and  French  Empires.  Examining  the  influence  of 
signals intelligence  within  one  of  these  colonial  settings  provides  an 
opportunity to measure the operational importance of wartime cryptanalysis. 
Through a careful analysis of the original intercepts, this article reconstructs the 
responses of Room 40, the Admiralty’s cryptology department, to Germany’s 
Moroccan intrigues and highlights the development of intelligence practices. It 
argues that strategies to deploy diplomatic intelligence emerged gradually, but 
that Germany’s enduring support for Moroccan dissidents suggests diplomatic 
cryptanalysis only secured modest results within an operational  context. 
 
In the autumn of 1915, the Director of Naval Intelligence, Captain (later Admiral 
Sir) William Reginald Hall, commissioned George Young to lead a political section 
within Room 40 that was designed to break Germany’s diplomatic codes. Despite 
Room 40’s early progress against Germany’s naval communications, their 
diplomatic codes were unsystematic, which made them far more difficult to 
penetrate since the numerical order of the figure group was entirely unrelated to 
the alphabetical order of the vocabulary. The political branch secured some 
minor success against Germany’s Foreign Office codes in the winter of 1915, but 
with the advent of machinery in May 1916 that could solve one hundred groups a 
day, Room 40’s diplomatic cryptanalysis became fully operational. Referred to as 
‘hat codes’ they revealed Germany’s most sensitive information, including a 
series of efforts intended to provoke an insurrection in Morocco.1 
 
Though Britain’s awareness of Germany’s covert intrigues in Morocco was first 
revealed in the early 1920s by the former head of Room 40, Sir Alfred Ewing, 
many historical accounts ignore this fact completely.2 Where it has been alluded 
to, the influence of British intelligence has only received superficial 
consideration.3 Admiral Sir William James, for instance, merely found that Room 
40 was able to ‘to follow closely on the tracks of the numerous German agents 
whose object it was to … stir up revolution in India, Persia, Afghanistan, and 
Morocco’.4 Paul Gannon also acknowledged the naval cryptographer’s awareness 
of Germany’s Moroccan intrigues, but he refrained from offering any analysis. 
Instead, it was claimed that ‘measuring the effectiveness of intelligence is 
extremely hard. Whether things would have turned out any differently in the 
political sphere without Room 40’s access to these detailed intercepts is 
uncertain’.5 Although James Wyllie and Michael McKinley briefly referenced 
A.E.W. Mason’s cloak and dagger activities in Morocco, they depended almost 
entirely on his fictional repertoire as evidence for such exploits.6 This level of 
scrutiny reflects the wider tradition of ‘factional disclosure’ within British. 
 
In a secret Admiralty memorandum Young wrote that the reading of 
diplomatic correspondence ‘made it possible to defeat German intrigues in Spain, 
Portugal, Ireland, and Morocco, including a series of risings in the latter country’.8 
But owing to a scarcity of source material, however, even by normal intelligence 
history standards, ascertaining Room 40’s influence in this matter raises a number 
of issues. Without previous examinations of the French and German archival 
record, a single British perspective cannot fully appreciate the extent of Allied 
intelligence collaboration, nor can it analyse Room 40’s intelligence product 
against confirmed German operations. Owing to a dearth of surviving intelligence 
assessments and reports, this article correlates information revealed by Room 40’s 
original interceptions with circumstantial evidence in the press and the British 
Foreign Office in order to reconstruct events that transpired in Morocco and 
assess Young’s claim. Using inferences gleaned from the intelligence product not 
only provides an insight into a hitherto neglected facet of Germany’s clandestine 
operations, it also provides some important observations into Room 40 and its 
leader outside of the over studied and sensationalised episodes within the 
conventional Room 40 narrative.9 
 
Though recent additions to the historiography of British World War I (WWI) 
signals intelligence have contested Room 40’s strategic success, this paper 
considers the applicability of these revisions to an operational perspective.10 
Consequently, it highlights the developments in Room 40’s understanding of 
diplomatic cryptanalysis by illustrating their increasing proficiency at deploying 
signals intelligence. Whereas previous studies have demonstrated the lack of 
intelligence distribution, this article also tentatively draws attention to the 
continued incoordination of British and Allied signals intelligence and Hall’s 
reluctance for direct intervention, that both arose from an initial averseness to 
disseminate the intelligence product.11 Although these problems were gradually 
resolved during the conflict, they were to continually hinder the operational 
impact of Room 40’s diplomatic cryptanalysis throughout the conflict. Germany’s 
unrelenting support for Moroccan insurgents was therefore able to generate 
significant difficulties that continued to frustrate French colonial ambitions 
beyond 1918. 
 
Origin of German interest 
In response to Germany’s growing claims to imperial expansion, Britain and 
France signed the Entente Cordiale in 1904, in the hope of concluding a 
generation of colonial disputes. While France finally endorsed Britain’s authority 
in Egypt, Britain sanctioned France’s claim to Morocco.12 The Moroccan 
Parliament, however, soon protested against increased colonial expansion and 
condemned the presence of all European advisors.13 With the assurance of 
German abetment, Sultan Abd al-Aziz called for an international conference at 
Algeciras.14 Germany hoped to capitalise on this opportunity, but it proved to be 
a disaster for their diplomatic credibility. Owing to Germany’s failure to generate 
opposition, the legitimacy of French and Spanish influence in Morocco was fully 
endorsed by the international community.15 Following the Agadir Crisis, the 
Treaty of Fez was signed in 1912, which formally established European authority 
in Morocco. The area surrounding Tangier became an international zone with the 
remainder divided into two protectorates. Spain controlled the northern and 
France the southern zone. Notwithstanding the intensifying European influence, 
the Sultan was to remain in possession of the symbols of power, if not its 
substance, and thus in theory, Morocco was to remain a sovereign state. 
 
Immediately following the outbreak of the WWI, the French interned numerous 
German citizens but efforts to curtail Germany’s transgressions were frustrated by 
the colonial context. Although the Sultan was technically at war with Germany the 
country was administered by two individual governments. As a neutral power, the 
Spanish were not required to expel German citizens, which theoretically allowed 
enemy agents to lead incursions into French Morocco from northern territories.16 
Consequently, Arthur Zimmermann, the German Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, instructed the Madrid embassy to attach great importance to their 
Moroccan endeavours in the belief that an insurrection in Morocco would 
encourage revolution throughout North Africa.17 A rebellion would also serve 
German strategy for practical reasons. Germany purportedly valued Moroccan 
agricultural exports at 20 million francs in 1914, which they estimated would 
double each year thereafter and provide a significant relief to France’s food 
deficit.18 Civil unrest also compelled France to increase their military presence in 
Morocco from 50,000 to 90,000 men, soldiers that would otherwise have been 
able to fight in France.19 
 
Germany soon established a network of agents at Larache and Melilla in the 
Spanish zone to conduct their intrigues, but a prominent Moroccan collaborator 
was required for a successful insurrection.20 Cultivating relations with factional 
leaders would also assist the incorporation of Morocco into Germany’s projected 
empire, but the potential for a general uprising was continually setback by the 
difficulties associated with finding such a person. Their initial choice was the 
former Sultan Adb al-Aziz but tentative negotiations broke down shortly after the 
outbreak of war and German efforts turned to his elder brother, Muley Hafid. 
Hafid had originally come to power in 1908 as a champion of Moroccan 
resistance, which he remained committed to following his forced abdication in 
1912. Hafid was also known to be strongly pro-German, which ensured he 
attracted substantial German interest.21 
 
As a neutral country, Spain was often the centre of espionage for both the 
Entente and Central Powers. So long as it remained directly removed from the 
attention of the Spanish public, however, Germany was permitted to undertake 
subversive activities against their enemies.22 Under the instructions of the 
Ambassador and the military attaché, Prince Max von Ratibor and Major Albert 
Kalle, the German embassy in Madrid was responsible for covert action in 
Morocco. The wireless link between Berlin and Madrid, therefore, provided an 
invaluable source of intelligence that revealed highly confidential 
correspondence. The Naval Intelligence Division (NID) also assembled its largest 
network of agents under Colonel Charles Thoroton at Gibraltar. Thoroton enjoyed 
a close relationship with Hubert Lyautey, the French Resident-General, who 
allegedly considered British intelligence vital to Moroccan security.23 The Sultan 
even honoured Thoroton in 1915 with the Order Ouissam Alaouite Chérifien, for 
undisclosed services to Morocco.24 The primary role of British naval intelligence 
at Gibraltar, however, was to collect intelligence on U-boat operations and it is 
unclear how active they were against intrigues in Morocco.25 Nevertheless, by 
June 1916 the wireless link had betrayed German relations with four prominent 
Moroccan rebels. 
 
Early inertia: Muley Hafid 
Germany’s initial efforts in the region concentrated on returning Muley Hafid to 
the Moroccan throne. Hafid had already been proclaimed Sultan in 1908 during a 
time of deep civil disorder and increasing European encroachment. Although he 
had viciously opposed his predecessor, Adb al-Aziz, for consenting to European 
intervention, the prolonged revolt that plagued Hafid’s reign eventually forced 
him to succumb to European pressure and accept the protectorate system.26 
Eventually, though, he refused to assist the French and began conspiring with 
dissident tribes committed to a jihad against the colonial authorities.27 Within 
three months of his arrival, therefore, Lyautey removed Hafid in favour of his 
more compliant brother, Yusef ben Hassan.28 
 
By 1914, Hafid had been exiled to Spain and began openly declaring his 
allegiance to Germany. The British representatives there noted how Hafid had 
come under the influence of the German Consul  at Barcelona and suggested 
that Germany intended to employ him in Morocco. At this time Room  40 had 
made little progress with diplomatic intercepts, and thus the primary source of 
information remained British representatives reporting on Hafid’s indiscreet 
interviews with the Spanish press.29 Hafid proclaimed that he would once again 
occupy the Moroccan throne under the auspices of the Germans, who he 
believed would shortly overcome the French and declare Moroccan 
independence.30 The advent of signals intelligence in this matter, however, did 
little to curtail Germany’s relations with Hafid and suggests that Room 40’s 
success within the field of diplomatic cryptanalysis was relatively slow to 
materialise. 
 
In August 1915, Hall supplied the Foreign Office with a memorandum received 
from a French Naval Attaché apparently confirming Hafid’s intention to initiate an 
insurgency in Morocco under the banner of holy war. While French naval 
intelligence had already contacted the British Foreign Office to discuss the matter, 
it nonetheless illustrates the importance of additional sources of intelligence and 
highlight’s Hall’s willingness to distribute this type of product.31 Despite Room 40’s 
remarkably quick progress with German naval signals, during the opening twenty 
months of war diplomatic intelligence largely relied on unchanged methods of 
collection. This alone proved insufficient to restrict German operations, but as this 
episode suggests, the advent of signals intelligence did little to impede 
subsequent relations with Hafid. Thus, notwithstanding Room 40’s willingness to 
deploy intelligence gathered on Germany’s naval signals as early as 1914, and 
despite their growing capability at diplomatic cryptanalysis, they proved far less 
willing to distribute this type of product. 
 
By 1916, however, Germany had failed to use Hafid in any of their designs. This 
unintentionally gave Room 40 the advantage. The establishment of the Political 
Branch had significantly increased Room 40’s ability to read Germany’s diplomatic 
correspondence and transmissions betraying their relations with Hafid were first 
intercepted in March 1916.32 By this time Hafid had been complaining to the press 
about the suspicion surrounding him, which made the British Foreign Office 
doubt the credibility of reports alleging his relationship with Germany.33 Room 
40, however, soon intercepted a message revealing German preparations to 
transport him to Morocco. This revealed that Hafid was a German agent and 
disclosed operational details that were unavailable through traditional sources. 
The embarkation was to take place at a sufficient distance from both the French 
coast and Gibraltar to preclude any chance of surprise intervention, while 
disembarkation was arranged near Melilla.34 The importance of secrecy evident 
within their correspondence demonstrated the significance of Room 40’s 
achievement. They could now be confident in their ability to intercept the most 
confidential German correspondence and monitor their conspiracies. 
 
Less than a fortnight later the Spanish Prime Minister, Conde de Romanones, 
gave assurances that all the vigilance necessary was being applied to prevent 
Hafid from returning to Morocco. It seems clear, however, that this was not a 
result of Room 40’s intelligence. On 28 April, a Foreign Office representative 
questioned whether Hafid should be considered an enemy, as there had been no 
evidence besides the French Naval Attaché’s memorandum that he was a German 
agent.35 The same argument was repeated again in May.36 It therefore seems 
likely that Room 40 never divulged their intelligence confirming Hafid’s allegiance. 
But this was to be of minor significance. On 15 June, Zimmermann informed the 
embassy that Hafid was no longer to be employed in this manner and plans to 
send him to Morocco were to be abandoned.37 The exact reason why German 
plans were frustrated at the last moment remains unclear. Given the evidence to 
the contrary, though, it is unlikely that it resulted from Room 40’s interference. 
Within the intercepted correspondence, for instance, Germany had questioned 
Hafid’s intentions from the beginning, and later suspected that their plans had 
been betrayed by one of his Turkish associates.38 Moreover, it also shows that 
they had begun considering numerous insurrectionary actions owing to a 
perceived lack of unity within Morocco.39 Given the apparent change in German 
strategy, the lingering doubts as to Hafid’s intentions, and his ostensible 
disregard for security, there is little wonder why Germany abandoned their plans. 
 
During the preliminary stages of German intrigues involving Muley Hafid, 
Room 40’s inability to collect signals intelligence demonstrates the reliance upon 
traditional intelligence sources during the early stages of the war. Despite the 
collection of signals intelligence from late 1915, its impact was far from 
immediate. Instead of providing evidence that could support allegations made in 
the press, Hall’s reluctance to distribute intelligence allowed suspicions to remain 
unconfirmed, which prevented an effective diplomatic response to Germany’s 
interference in the region.40 
 
Indirect intervention: El Hiba 
As one of the most powerful leaders of armed resistance, German ambitions 
soon turned to the pretender to the Moroccan Sultanate, Ahmed al-Hiba, most 
commonly known as El Hiba.41 This afforded Room 40 a far greater opportunity 
to gather intelligence. During Germany’s initial intrigues with Hafid, Room 40 had 
made little progress with diplomatic messages, as the shortage of staff meant 
that they were forced to focus on naval signals.42 Following their expansion and 
the establishment of the political branch they were far better equipped to deal 
with diplomatic correspondence. Despite the prospect of defeating German 
intrigues in Morocco, and Hall’s apparent aptitude for successfully wielding 
intelligence, the evidence suggests that Room 40’s cryptology was operationally 
insignificant. While Daniel Larsen has argued that Hall deliberately withheld 
intelligence to use as a political weapon in order to attack government positions 
or policies that he was personally opposed to, this episode further demonstrates 
his tendency to withhold intelligence. Since this information was of little political 
value to Hall, it reflects his inherent apprehensions about security that were to 
equally hinder success.43 Having witnessed his father, Ma al-’Aynayn, lead the 
armed resistance during the first decade of the twentieth century, Hiba 
proclaimed himself Amir al-Mujahidin in 1912, and as the leader of all those 
fighting the holy war he vowed to expel the French from Morocco. With a force 
of 5000 men, he captured Marrakech with ease and quickly represented the 
greatest threat to French security. Room 40 first uncovered Germany’s apparent 
plans to employ Hiba in December 1915 when intercepts revealed that agents in 
Mellila and Larache had established relations with him and other dissident 
rebels.44 Further intercepts received in August suggested that Hiba was 
prepared to assist Germany in order to obtain complete authority and remove 
French colonial rule.45 Agents responsible for conducting the operation were 
swiftly smuggled into the Sous and began work at Ifni to manage the affair.46 In 
order to ensure a successful rebellion, the German General Staff had reportedly 
allocated two million marks to finance Hiba’s undertaking.47 Given the expense, 
this was a considerable operation and marked a   significant opportunity for 
Room 40 to frustrate German objectives in the region. 
 
Support for Hiba was inevitably hampered by the geopolitical situation since 
all German, Austrian and Turkish nationals had been banished from the French 
zone. Providing logistical support to Hiba who resided in a remote southern area 
of French Morocco would thus require successful covert action. Owing to the 
importance attached to the operation, German strategists began devising a 
method to provide the appropriate resources. By October, Zimmermann had 
evidently recognised the difficulty of supplying arms and sent instructions to the 
military attaché to obtain them independently, which Room 40 intercepted.48 
Even if the acquisition of arms proved successful, however, the problem of 
smuggling them into Morocco undetected remained an arduous task. In 
December 1915, despite the considerable difficulties in both its arrangement and 
execution, they began discussing the possibility of transporting war materials to 
Morocco using submarines.49 
 
In June 1916, Room 40 intercepted confirmation that German plans to covertly 
smuggle war materials to El Hiba were to proceed. Zimmermann informed Kalle 
that ‘a line of communication for arms, money and persons will be arranged for 
the beginning of October by submarine to a port in Sus[sic] territory’.50 On 22 
August, Room 40 obtained a more comprehensive account of the operation. The 
submarine’s cargo was to include four German and Turkish agents, several 
machine guns, rifles, munitions, French military uniforms, substantial funds, and 
even ‘flying machines’. Effective prevention, however, required the exact location 
and expected date of disembarkation. In August, the Madrid Embassy was 
informed that the location of disembarkation had been set as Wadi Arksis, Draa, 
or Wadi Assaka, of which the former was most likely. Hiba was also instructed to 
position lookout parties on the Moroccan coast in November.51 On 4 
September, Room 40 received confirmation that Wadi Arksis was to be the 
landing place.52 Hiba approved the location of Wadi Arksis and by 7 October 
preparations for the submarine’s arrival were complete.53 On 27 October, Room 
40 received reports that a submarine carrying four machine guns, one 7.9-inch 
gun, 1000 rifles, ammunition, and 50,000 francs had left Germany on 20 October 
for either Wadi Assaka or Draa on the French coast of Morocco.54 Even with the 
last minute change in destination, the intelligence that Room 40 had collected 
afforded NID an incredible opportunity to prevent operational support for 
Moroccan insurgents from materialising.  
 
Despite the opportunity signals intelligence had provided, Hall seemingly 
decided against direct intervention and instead preferred to inform the French of 
the submarine. How far he revealed the full extent of Room 40’s intelligence is 
uncertain, but the arrival and disembarkation of the submarine suggests that the 
French either did not possess adequate intelligence or that they lacked the 
motivation to prevent its arrival. Of the two, the latter seems least likely. The 
notable French naval presence in the region indicates that they had been made 
aware of illicit activities there, but their failure to impede the operation suggests 
that they were perhaps ignorant of specific details.55 Angry at the French failure 
to prevent the submarine’s disembarkation, Admiral Oliver, the Director of Naval 
Operations, exclaimed; ‘we warned the French of this possibility about six or eight 
weeks ago’.56 The fact that NID warned them of a ‘possibility’ and not a confirmed 
operation implies that the full extent of their intelligence was not divulged. 
Crucially, however, if NID only warned the French ‘six or eight weeks ago’ they 
would have been unaware of the last minute change of destination, which was 
only received by Room 40 three weeks before its arrival. This piece of information 
was essential to the operation’s success and the failure to divulge it demonstrates 
that inter-allied intelligence collaboration remained in its infancy. 
 
Nevertheless, aside from the operational failures, the intelligence gathered by 
Room 40 was to have an enduring impact on German intrigues involving Hiba. In 
January 1917, Hiba defeated Haida ou Mouiz, the chief supporter of the French 
in the Sous. This decisive victory added fresh impetus to the German campaign. 
Haida’s death ensured Hiba’s influence increased exponentially, and the threat of 
a full-armed resistance against the French became a real possibility. Accordingly, 
the Madrid embassy urgently sought to take full advantage and instructed Berlin to 
rapidly supply the necessary resources.57 Upon realising that the French had 
been made aware of their previous attempt, the prospect of sending further 
supplies in a submarine was considered unfeasible, at least for the near future.58 
But by failing to prevent Germany’s initial support, Hiba’s unrelenting resistance 
continued until 1919, after the armistice precluded any further German 
involvement and when France was once again fully able to enforce its 
occupation. 
 
While Peter Freeman has illustrated the lack of collaboration between Room 
40 and MI1(b), the War Office’s cryptology department, until the autumn of 1916, 
the involvement of French Intelligence in this matter suggests that British signals 
intelligence had equally begun to value the importance of inter-allied intelligence 
co-operation during this period.59 The lack of complete disclosure, however, 
indicates that they continued to prioritise security over distribution and 
operational success, and that Hall had not yet determined an effective strategy 
for disseminating diplomatic intelligence. Although he may have lacked the 
confidence to wield signals intelligence independently and effectively in 1916, by 
1917 Hall received reports of another German plot intending to smuggle 
precious wolfram ore on the Erri Berro; this time he would be ready to ensure 
that they did not succeed.60 
 Direct action: Abdel Malek and Raisuli 
Following the difficulties of operating in French Morocco, Germany soon turned 
to dissidents within the Spanish zone. The first to accept German support was 
Abdul Malek. Malek was the grandson of Abdel Kader who had gained fame for 
his campaign of resistance in Algeria.61 He had himself fought in the resistance 
against Adb al-Aziz in 1902, but deserted after certain defeat became 
unavoidable. Malek subsequently received a commission under Aziz and was 
appointed chief of police at Tangier by Muley Hafid, but soon began pursuing 
complete sovereignty over Morocco instead.62 The second prominent rebel to 
align with Germany was Mawlay Ahmad al-Raysuni, commonly referred to as 
Raisuli. Descended from Mulai Idris, the founder of the Islamic Empire in 
Morocco, Raisuli abandoned his aristocratic lifestyle for a more adventurous and 
lucrative profession as a cattle thief.63 Robbery soon escalated into more sinister 
crimes but following the abduction of an American businessman, the United 
States forced the Moroccan authorities to comply with Raisuli’s demands and he 
was made governor of Tangier. Nonetheless, his extreme violence and tyranny 
quickly prompted a European intervention that removed him from power and 
led to his championing of Moroccan resistance.64 
 
Since German operations once again violated Spanish neutrality, Room 40’s 
intelligence could potentially generate political difficulties for Germany and upset 
their Moroccan insurgencies. Although the Spanish had been made aware of 
suspicious German activities, convincing rebellious tribes to attack the French 
had occasioned a period of relative peace in their Protectorate.65 The disunity 
within the Spanish military and a widespread aversion to any form of colonial 
counter-insurgency made a Spanish intervention practically impossible.66 
Nevertheless, their increasingly weakened position in Morocco was cultivating 
fervent dissident activity, which the British assessed to be responsible for a 
growing popular hostility over the mismanagement of the conflict.67 Thus, 
although the strict neutrality of the Spanish Government would most likely make 
an official protest redundant, inciting a popular  condemnation of Germany’s 
continued support for Moroccan dissidents could have proven productive.68 
While there is a history of intelligence services employing the press to manipulate 
public opinion through leaking intelligence, Hall has been particularly identified 
as an early proponent of this tradition.69 Employing patriotic journalists to 
impede German support for Malek and Raisuli, therefore, reflects Hall’s pioneering 
work in what was to become an important channel for future intelligence 
practice. 
 
In June 1916, Raisuli accepted German support and demanded 1 million 
pesetas to finance his endeavour. Germany seemingly obliged and initially sent 
300,000 with the remainder to follow the commencement of hostilities.70 By 
March 1917, however, Raisuli had still not agreed to initiate action against the 
French. Despite proclaiming himself ‘Sultan of the jihad’, he insisted that he was 
unable to mount an offensive without first receiving additional arms and 
munitions, as well as the full subsidy promised to him.71 Raisuli gave assurances 
that upon receipt of such support he would instigate a movement against the 
French but by this point Germany distrusted his reassurances.72 They were 
prudent to doubt his credibility. According to numerous native reports, Raisuli 
often preached jihad but was unlikely to sever relations with Spain since they 
essentially financed him, guaranteed him unrestricted authority, and proposed to 
appoint him Grand Vizier.73 Since his deliberations with the Spanish continued, 
the German authorities decided to delay the subsidy intended for him.74 Fearing 
that his bluff had been called, Raisuli desperately sought German assistance, 
assuring them that his preparations were complete, and declared that he was 
ready and willing to commence hostilities against the French.75 
 
Whereas Raisuli never emphatically declared his intentions, Malek was firmly 
committed to insurrectionary action against the French. Malek’s forces were well 
trained and led by German officers, mostly deserters from the French Foreign 
Legion.76 By the beginning of March 1917, he had defeated the French during 
several engagements and began attracting substantial support from several 
rebellious tribes.77 Following his victories and the arrival of fresh insurgents, 
further operations were constrained by a severe lack of ammunition. Since Spain 
had recently expelled the German consul at Tetouan for intriguing with Malek, 
Germany postponed the payment of one million pesetas for the purchase of 
munitions.78 Less than two weeks later, though, Berlin instructed Kalle to send 
Malek the full subsidy; their reckless disregard towards Spanish relations possibly 
prompted by the United States’ declaration of war four days earlier.79 
 
Hugh Cleland Hoy, Hall’s former private secretary, intimated that Room 40 
achieved some minor operational success against Abdel Malek during 1917. 
Decoded messages supposedly revealed Germany’s plans to dispatch another U-
boat to Morocco, this time to a site near Larache, in order to resupply Malek’s 
insurgency. Hoy claimed that these interceptions were handed to the French 
Naval Attaché, who promptly transmitted the information to the naval 
authorities in Paris. The submarine arrived  on schedule and was destroyed along 
with its prized cargo. Aside from the undoubted success that this operation 
represented, Malek had already received sufficient support that ensured his 
campaign continued and Germany was still capable and willing to provide further 
assistance.80 Consequently,   it was only through exploiting the issues of Spanish 
neutrality that German intrigues could be more permanently terminated. 
 
In April 1918, a press campaign in The Times unleashed a scathing attack on 
German intrigues in Morocco, which was arguably facilitated by leaked 
intelligence. In comparison, three articles published in December 1915 reported 
German intrigues in Morocco, but they were hardly a feat of investigative 
journalism. With no mention of specific plots or Moroccan agents, they merely 
gave a vague account of Germany’s perceived intentions in Morocco.81 Between 
December 1915 and April 1918, four further articles presumed the existence of 
German subversions in Morocco, while three others reported German propaganda 
in the region. Yet between 2 April and 1 May 1918, seven meticulously detailed 
articles appeared condemning such activity. Notwithstanding Spain’s continual 
denial, the reports initially emphasised the existence of relations between 
Germany and Raisuli.82 A few days later, alleged German proposals to Raisuli were 
exposed. They highlighted Germany’s ambition of claiming sovereignty over 
Spanish Morocco following a tribal revolution, and their promise to provide 
unlimited authority over the Northern provinces to Raisuli. It was also suggested 
that these plans would follow their imminent offensive in France.83 The 
campaign culminated with two articles published on 31 April and 1 May. The 
articles purported the existence of a German controlled region running 
continuously from the straits of Gibraltar through to the Algerian frontier and down 
into the French Protectorate. German sabotage was allegedly coordinated at 
Melilla, Tetouan, and Larache in the Spanish zone. At Tetouan, Bohn the acting 
German consul, Glasser, and Schumacher, supposedly employed numerous agents 
and passed instructions to Raisuli. Melilla supposedly served a similar purpose 
for Abdel Malek. Reischlag, Coppel and Tausent were supposedly employed to 
forward arms, munitions, and money to assist Malek’s cause.84 The remaining 
circumstantial evidence suggests that these articles were at least partially 
informed by Room 40’s intelligence. Young’s contention that Room 40 was able to 
defeat several German intrigues in the region intimates that they at least 
administered some form of response, and in his semi-autobiographical history of 
NID during the WWI, Hall commended the significance of the press to 
intelligence work. Though there is no mention of Moroccan intrigues, he gave 
particular reference to Lord Northcliffe’s publications, The Times and The Daily 
Mail, as the source of several successful outcomes.85 His propensity for 
independently disclosing intelligence to the press was also characteristic of his 
tenure as Director of Naval Intelligence. Although it was undoubtedly a forgery, 
Hall is often considered responsible for leaking the infamous Zinoviev Letter to 
the Daily Mail in 1924, given that it was ‘entirely consistent with his earlier 
career’.86 
 
According to Foreign Office sources in Morocco, Walter Harris, The Times 
correspondent in Tangier allegedly responsible for the articles, received a report 
disclosing German proposals to Raisuli, but neither the British nor the French 
authorities received any confirmation that such a report ever existed.87 Nor 
were they ostensibly aware of the specific details of German plots in the 
region.88 Harris’ character as a keen adventurer and staunchly patriotic expat, 
however, made him an ideal candidate for surreptitiously disclosing 
intelligence.89 As well as working as a semi-official British propagandist, in an 
autobiographical note of his wartime career, Harris actually professed to have 
worked for the ‘Admiralty’s Intelligence Department’ between October 1917 and 
April 1918.90 
 
Although this collaboration was supposedly a one sided affair in which Harris 
passed NID detailed reports on the Moroccan situation, correspondence with his 
editors suggests that it was more reciprocal than Harris cared to admit. Although 
he had authored a number of unpublished articles in 1917 on Abdul Malek and 
Raisuli, that briefly mentioned the ‘anti-ally activities’ of Germany, he never 
explicitly or directly referred to any intrigues beyond mere propaganda.91 Nor 
are his telegrams to the editorial staff particularly revealing in regard to German 
espionage.92 Thus, his detailed analyses of German covert operations did not 
appear until a later date, which not only coincided with his purported 
cooperation with NID, but also, the arrival of Commander Cozens-Hardy of the 
Naval Intelligence Department in late 1917. Not only does this meeting directly 
connect him to NID, Harris insisted that his editors refrain from publishing his 
earlier articles until they had also consulted Cozens-Hardy.93 The Admiralty 
allegedly also requested that their publication be postponed.94 The Times 
received Harris’ detailed revelations of German intrigues, therefore, at the exact 
point at which he was supposedly touring Morocco accompanied by Cozens-
Hardy.95 
 
Shortly before the beginning of the press campaign, the Foreign Office were 
considering an official protest regarding Spain’s continual failure to inhibit 
German interference, but Hall insisted they refrain from doing so.96 Given that the 
King had recently demonstrated a preference for dispensing with a Prime Minister 
rather than severing relations with Berlin after a U-boat attack on a Spanish 
vessel, any official complaint would have been equally disregarded.97 Hall’s 
reluctance for Foreign Office intervention likewise suggests that he was 
cognisant of an alternative solution, and the timing of his interjection suggests 
that it was most likely the press campaign featured in The Times. The total 
exclusion of El Hiba throughout the press campaign is also surprising had it been a 
purely journalistic endeavour, given that he had previously constituted the greatest 
threat to Morocco.98 But by 1918, Room 40 had demonstrated that support for 
Hiba had been significantly constrained, and German support for Malek and 
Raisuli had become far more pressing. Consequently, Hall’s primary concern was 
to provoke opposition to Germany’s clandestine activities in Spain, and there was 
little incentive to disclose the awareness of German involvement with El Hiba.  
 
Although confirming whether The Times categorically revealed Room 40’s 
intelligence is incredibly difficult, there is a compelling case suggesting that Harris 
provided the platform for NID to influence Spanish policies in Morocco, whilst 
simultaneously maintaining the anonymity of Room 40. While there is some 
evidence that suggests other sources of information were more pertinent, it is 
often vague, contradictory, or hyperbolic. Mason, for instance, publically 
accredited himself with preventing German money getting into the hands of 
Moroccan rebels, but the ‘exact means [he] employed can no longer be 
discovered’.99 The surviving reports he provided the Foreign Office equally fail to 
substantiate his efficacy, given that they omit any detailed revelations of German 
machinations and were instead focused on the competency of French colonial 
management and infrastructure.100 In any case, Mason had completed his work 
in Morocco by 1916 and became primarily concerned with secret service work in 
Spain, which would have made any personal intervention somewhat 
problematic.101 
 
The Consular Service provided the most notable source of human intelligence 
in Morocco, but although the Vice-Consuls at Larache and Tangier claimed to be 
intercepting communication between German agents and tribesmen, it is 
doubtful that this was particularly effective.102 As first secretary   at Tangier, 
Jack Garnett monitored German activities and produced ‘evidence’ of night 
signalling to submarines off the Moroccan coast, but this information merely 
inferred German involvement with Moroccan insurgents based on local 
hearsay.103 Writing to Cozens-Hardy in late 1917, Garnett expressed his desire to 
‘get the Germans cleared bag and baggage out of the Spanish zone’, but that his 
efforts were frustrated owing to the difficulty of obtaining evidence of 
Germany’s transgressions.104 Garnett himself described the British consular 
service in Morocco as ‘so small as to cause what I could only call 
 waste of men, time, and money’, and with no Vice-Consul at Melilla, they 
remained uninformed of specific intrigues involving Raisuli, which were to 
feature heavily in the press campaign.105 Hall even personally intervened to 
prohibit the establishment of a Vice-Consul at Melilla, again implying that he was 
diligently monitoring the situation in Morocco.106 The majority of reports 
produced by consular agents, therefore, merely depicted presumed German 
interactions with local tribesmen.107 Although Garnett had successfully 
infiltrated Germany’s postal system in Morocco, which betrayed propaganda 
efforts in the region, it provided little insight into their clandestine operations.108 
Rather than the instigator of any press releases, Garnett actually attempted to 
suppress Harris’ earlier reporting owing to discussions supposedly underway in 
Paris and London.109 
 
The subsequent correspondence between Berlin and Madrid implied that the 
press campaign had deeply unsettled the German representatives in Madrid. 
German mitigations eagerly denied the accusations and insisted that Britain was 
merely attempting to generate hostility between Spain and Germany on account 
of recent setbacks in France.110 The démenti proved temporarily successful.111 
Following the publication of ‘A German Zone in Morocco’, the most substantial 
criticism of Germany’s efforts in the region, the Madrid embassy expected a far 
more unsympathetic response.112 Kalle was afraid that the intelligence bureau 
at Melilla would shortly be closed and there were further fears that the 
Ambassador, the secretary, and both attachés would be expelled.113 In reply to 
complaints made by the German embassy, however, the Spanish authorities 
repeatedly stated that they paid no attention to the reports whatsoever, and 
only took action against the conspirators following intense pressure from the 
Entente. But in June, Spain eventually ousted four German agitators who had been 
supporting the Malek operation.114 
 
The weight of the press campaign was such that the Sultan bestowed an order 
of merit upon Walter Harris for exposing German support for Moroccan 
insurgents.115 During the opening months of 1918, Malek had reportedly 
received substantial quantities of ammunition and financial support from Melilla, 
which the British believed to be financing a considerable militia and increasing 
activities against the French.116 Following the political difficulties with Spain and 
the dismissal of German agents from Melilla, German support for Malek declined. 
In late June 1918, Kalle informed Berlin that it was no longer possible to offer 
Malek financial assistance, nor was it feasible to send arms and munitions.117 
The General Staff in Berlin concurred.118 Following Germany’s inability to 
provide assistance, French operations against Malek proved immediately 
effective. According to Foreign Office sources, two engagements in July resulted 
in the death of four Germans and 300 tribesmen with only five French fatalities 
and sixteen wounded.119 The resulting impact on German support for Raisuli 
was less significant. Agents supporting Raisuli from Larache had already been 
expelled in February, before the publications in The Times came to light.120 
Moreover, the British calculated that his prolonged inactivity had left him 
increasingly unpopular among the tribes and he began losing support and 
influence.121 Although Germany’s financial support to Raisuli persisted, he 
continued to oscillate between Germany and Spain in order to maintain support 
from both and enhance his own personal agenda. 
 
Whilst this episode reveals a greater use of signals intelligence, the strategic 
significance outweighed the operational effectiveness. Hall’s use of the press in 
1918 proved an effective technique to limit German covert activities in Morocco 
while simultaneously concealing the secrets of Room 40. Despite the influence of 
the press campaign and the eventual decline of German assistance, NID’s 
operational success remained modest. Besides the minor setback achieved in 1917, 
the impact of signals intelligence only materialised around June 1918, but Room 
40 first discovered German intrigues with Malek and Raisuli in June of 1916. 
Although this abeyance was generated by insurmountable political difficulties, 
there was nevertheless a two-year period where Germany was able to assist both 
rebels almost entirely unimpeded.122 Thus, aside from the limited strategic gains 
in 1918, this belated response inevitably led to considerable operational 
difficulties for the colonial authorities and hardly amounts to another sensational 
success befitting the traditional Room 40 narrative. 
 
The impact of signals intelligence 
In 1919, Louis Barthou, a former French Prime Minister, claimed that, of the 
three allied powers maintaining possessions in North Africa, France suffered the 
least political dissidence and were even able to expand their authority in 
Morocco.123 The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, George Curzon, 
however, held a rather different view. As Minister for Foreign affairs from 1917, it 
was in Barthou’s interest to suggest that his tenure fashioned a period of peaceful 
colonial relations. Curzon contended that there were several extremely critical 
moments in Morocco during the war and only through tireless military activity 
was their position upheld.124 
 
Despite Barthou’s contention, peace was an illusion even after the Armistice. 
Raisuli finally launched an open rebellion against the Spanish in 1919 and 
although French forces repeatedly pushed Malek back, he was reportedly able to 
reappear fully supplied and capable of renewing the offensive.125 The severity 
was amplified in the Spanish zone as years of inactivity against German intrigues 
had led to excessive amounts of arms remaining within easy reach of insurgents. 
Raisuli’s forces were thus allegedly able to conduct daily skirmishes against the 
Spanish along with larger, more deadly engagements.126  
 
By July 1921, Spain’s military power in Morocco had all but collapsed. Following 
considerable defeats and widespread desertion among their Moroccan soldiers, 
the eastern occupied regions revolted and Spain’s defensive positions were either 
overwhelmed or abandoned. The Eastern Command lost 8668 men, including its 
commanding officer, 117 guns, and all the land gains made since 1909.127 
What began as a Spanish-Berber war over control of the Rif highlands eventually 
became a predominantly French-Berber conflict. Marshall Philippe Pétain 
described it as a war fought against ‘the most powerful and best armed enemy we 
have ever encountered in colonial operations’. By 1926, over 2000 soldiers had 
been killed and over 8000 wounded, far exceeding any other colonial counter-
insurgency during the 1920s. Having already spent close to one billion francs, 
Pétain recognised that victory would only be assured following a colossal 
expenditure of both blood and money.128 
 
Although these developments materialised after German influence in the 
region had largely dissipated, the precarious situation in Morocco was captured in 
an intelligence report produced in October 1918. Despite the scarcity of evidence 
regarding Thoroton’s work, a solitary report in the Foreign Office archives 
illustrates the gravity of the situation in Morocco and highlights the number of 
multifarious threats emerging in the French Protectorate. To maintain order in 
the Rif highlands, 80 per cent of Lyautey’s mobile forces were concentrated in 
the north-eastern regions, leaving only 2000 soldiers to defend Marrakesh 
against the incursions of El-Hiba, whilst simultaneously required to repel Abdul 
Malek’s operations 100 km away. French forces were being stretched to the limit 
and Thoroton considered their authority to be hanging by a thread, ‘and that 
thread was wearing thin’. The Spanish, he argued, were utterly impotent, 
confined to their fortified towns and unable to defend their isolated posts. He 
alleged that their position had become so untenable by 1918 that a Pan-Islamic 
rising able to spread throughout North Africa would almost certainly follow any 
further military defeat suffered by the colonial powers.129 Fortunately for the 
European authorities, victory in France less than two months later alleviated the 
situation and helped prevent such catastrophic circumstances from arising. In 
spite of Room 40’s detailed awareness of German operations, the situation in 
Morocco was only improved with the influx of French troops following the 
Armistice. By their own admission, therefore, NID had demonstrated little impact 
against German operations in the region. As the war progressed, Moroccan 
dissidents secured growing success and power, and the authority of the French 
was increasingly destabilised despite Room 40’s awareness of German operational 
support. Despite the cumulative strength of Moroccan insurgents, their ultimate 
failure to achieve independence most likely resulted from the problems inherent 
within Moroccan nationalism, rather than the deployment of British signals 
intelligence. Since Morocco contained a multitude of ethnicities both racially 
and linguistically separated, the distinctions between Berber and Arab and town 
and tribal discouraged the formation of a national identity. The ability of any 
insurgent to unite the country against European domination, 
therefore, was an exceedingly problematical undertaking.130 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that secrecy remained paramount up to 1917. Although 
Room 40 had acquired an intimate awareness of German plans for Hafid, Hall 
chose not to share that information beyond the Admiralty. As a consequence, 
neither Hall nor diplomatic cryptanalysis could have any operational impact. 
Given that this was a relatively novel source of intelligence that also went 
beyond their traditional naval remit, the insistence to maintain secrecy was 
undeniably prudent, but it nonetheless constrained its influence. Although by the 
end of 1916 the importance of intelligence dissemination had been cautiously 
recognised, even between Allied partners, the operational potential of 
cryptanalysis had not yet been fully realised. But by 1918, as the response to 
Abdul Malek and Raisuli suggests, the confidence and ability to independently 
deploy intelligence had emerged. By analysing a series of consecutive responses, 
therefore, it becomes clear that the impact of signals intelligence reflected the 
wider development of British cryptanalysis. Just as the formation of code 
breaking organisations in 1914 represented the logical culmination of an 
emerging trend, Room 40’s operational impact was equally reliant on 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary advances.131 
 
Although Young professed that Room 40’s intelligence made it possible to defeat 
German intrigues in Morocco, the surviving evidence intimates that despite the 
advances made in intelligence deployment, the significance of signals intelligence 
in this instance was inconsequential. Although it caused some minor strategic 
setbacks to German designs, the absence of any substantial operational 
impediment resulting from Room 40’s intelligence allowed German backed 
insurgents to continue their campaigns against the French and have an enduring 
impact upon their colonial ambitions. The landing of the submarine resupplying 
Hiba and the delayed response to both Malek’s and Raisuli’s insurgencies, for 
instance, both led to immediate difficulties for the French, and to a lesser extent 
the Spanish, that were to continue beyond the Armistice in 1918. 
 
Exposing Germany’s Moroccan intrigues also further reiterates the scale of the 
intelligence war between 1914 and 1918. Since it was conducted over multiple 
continents and involved an unprecedented number of belligerents, influencing 
politics and diplomacy on such a vast scale was too ambitious for any 
individual.132 But the implied difficulties in intelligence collaboration with the 
French in 1916 and the nature of Hall’s response to Raisuli and Malek in 1918, 
both demonstrate a penchant  for independently controlling intelligence. A 
committee examining the work of NID during the war found that Hall had too 
often personally intervened in diplomatic affairs using Room 40’s interceptions; 
intelligence that they deemed should have been passed immediately to the 
Foreign Office.133 Had he been more forthcoming in his willingness to distribute 
intelligence, and the relevant British and French authorities made fully aware of 
Germany’s clandestine activities, managing a coordinated response could have 
generated a far more effective policy in preventing German support from 
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